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Abstract
A handful of recent cryptographic proposals rely on the conjectured hardness of the following problem
in the ring of integers of a cyclotomic number field: given a basis of a principal ideal that is guaranteed to
have a “rather short” generator, find such a generator. Recently, Bernstein and Campbell-Groves-Shepherd
sketched potential attacks against this problem; most notably, the latter authors claimed a polynomial-time
quantum algorithm. (Alternatively, replacing the quantum component with an algorithm of Biasse and
Fieker would yield a classical subexponential-time algorithm.) A key claim of Campbell et al. is that
one step of their algorithm—namely, decoding the log-unit lattice of the ring to recover a short generator
from an arbitrary one—is classically efficient (whereas the standard approach on general lattices takes
exponential time). However, very few convincing details were provided to substantiate this claim.
In this work, we clarify the situation by giving a rigorous proof that the log-unit lattice is indeed
efficiently decodable, for any cyclotomic of prime-power index. Combining this with the quantum
algorithm from a recent work of Biasse and Song confirms the main claim of Campbell et al. Our proof
consists of two main technical contributions: the first is a geometrical analysis, using tools from analytic
number theory, of the standard generators of the group of cyclotomic units. The second shows that for a
wide class of typical distributions of the short generator, a standard lattice-decoding algorithm can recover
it, given any generator.
By extending our geometrical analysis, as a second main contribution we obtain an efficient algorithm
that, given any generator of a principal ideal (in a prime-power cyclotomic), finds a 2O˜(
√
n)-approximate
shortest vector in the ideal. Combining this with the result of Biasse and Song yields a quantum
polynomial-time algorithm for the 2O˜(
√
n)-approximate Shortest Vector Problem on principal ideal
lattices.
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1 Introduction
Over the past several years, lattices have emerged as an attractive foundation for cryptography. The most
efficient (and potentially practical) lattice-based cryptosystems are related to ideal lattices, which correspond
to ideals in certain families of rings, e.g., Z[X]/(X2k + 1). Representative works include [HPS98, Mic02,
LMPR08, Gen09, LPR10].
More recently, a handful of cryptographic constructions have relied directly on principal ideals that have
“relatively short” generators, which serve as secret keys.1 These include a simplified variant of Gentry’s
original fully homomorphic encryption scheme [Gen09] due to Smart and Vercauteren [SV10], the closely
related Soliloquy encryption scheme [CGS14], and candidate cryptographic multilinear maps [GGH13,
LSS14]. Breaking these systems is no harder than solving the following problem, which we call the Short
Generator of a Principal Ideal Problem (SG-PIP): given some Z-basis of an ideal that is guaranteed to have a
“short” generator g, find a sufficiently short generator (not necessarily g itself).
Potential attacks on SG-PIP in certain rings were sketched by Bernstein [Ber14b] and Campbell, Groves,
and Shepherd [CGS14]. The basic structure of the attacks, which appears to be folklore in computational
number theory, consists of two main parts:
• First, given a Z-basis of the principal ideal, find some arbitrary (not necessarily short) generator of
the ideal. For this task, which is known as the Principal Ideal Problem (PIP), the state of the art is an
algorithm of Biasse and Fieker [BF14, Bia14], whose running time has only a subexponential 2n
2/3+
dependence on n, the degree of the ring (over Z). In addition, building on the recent work of Eisentra¨ger
et al. [EHKS14], polynomial-time quantum algorithms for PIP have recently been described in two
independent works [CGS14, BS15], the latter of which provides a fully rigorous treatment.
• Second, transform the generator found in the previous phase into a short generator, thereby recovering
the secret key, or its functional equivalent. The standard approach casts this task as a closest vector
problem (CVP) on the Dirichlet “log-unit” lattice.
In this work, we focus entirely on the second phase, i.e., on recovering a short generator from any
generator. At first, one might suspect that this is a hard problem: in general, the fastest known algorithms for
CVP (even allowing quantum) run in exponential 2Ω(n) time [MV10, ADS15], or in less time but with much
weaker guarantees on the solution quality (e.g., [LLL82, Bab85, Sch87]). In addition, Bernstein [Ber14b]
suggested an algebraic approach that may yield slightly subexponential running times in number fields having
many subfields, but it remains to be seen if this proposal can be carried through. Regardless of the method
used, it is not obvious a priori whether solving CVP on the log-unit lattice yields a sufficiently short generator;
much depends on the geometry of the lattice (in the relevant norm) and the quality of the solution.
A promising observation made by several researchers [CGS14, Ber14a] is that the CVP instances arising
in the second phase have some implicit structure: the existence of a “rather short” generator (by choice of
the secret key) implies that the target point is “somewhat close” to the log-unit lattice; CVP with such a
distance guarantee is more commonly known as bounded-distance decoding (BDD) and is sometimes easier
than the general case of CVP. Indeed, Garg, Gentry and Halevi [GGH13] gave an improved variant of the
Gentry-Szydlo algorithm [GS02] which shows that in cyclotomic rings having power-of-two index, BDD
on the log-unit lattice is efficiently solvable to within sub-polynomial n− log logn distance. However, this
threshold is much too small to handle the BDD instances arising in cryptosystems.
Campbell, Groves, and Shepherd [CGS14] were the first to claim an efficient solution to the second phase
above. In more detail, they asserted that in cyclotomic rings having power-of-two index, the second phase can
1A principal ideal in a commutative ring R is of the form gR = {g · r : r ∈ R} for some g ∈ R, called a generator of the ideal.
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be accomplished simply by decoding the log-unit lattice using a standard algorithm such as LLL [LLL82].
However, this claim was not accompanied by a proof.2 Nevertheless, experiments in cryptographically
relevant choices of dimension have shown that decoding is indeed practically efficient [She14, Sch15], giving
strong evidence that the approach of [CGS14] does indeed work.
Contributions. Our first main contribution is a rigorous proof showing that the second phase above can be
solved in polynomial time, in any cyclotomic of prime-power index. Our proof is based on classical ideas
and results from analytical number theory, along with some techniques from probability theory, and consists
of two main technical contributions. First, in Section 3 we use standard tools from analytical number theory,
such as bounds on Dirichlet L-series, to elucidate the geometry of a standard set of generators for the group
of cyclotomic units. (The cyclotomic units correspond either to the log-unit lattice itself, or to a sublattice
whose index is conjectured to be quite small.) Using this geometry, in Sections 4 and 5 we show that for
a wide class of typical distributions of the secret generator—e.g., Gaussian-like distributions—the naı¨ve
“round-off” lattice-decoding algorithm [Len82, Bab85] (using the standard generators of the cyclotomic units)
can be used to efficiently recover the secret short generator, given any generator of the ideal.3 To complement
these results, in Appendix B we give concrete numerical data demonstrating that the second phase succeeds
for all practical choices of dimension.
Our second main contribution concerns the questions: in an arbitrary principal ideal (of a prime-power
cyclotomic), how long can a shortest generator be? And how short of a generator can we find efficiently? In
Section 6, we show that for an overwhelming majority of principal ideals, the shortest generator is a 2Θ˜(
√
n)
factor longer than the shortest nonzero vector in the ideal. Moreover, one can efficiently find a generator
satisfying this bound, given an arbitrary generator. The first of these facts means that the principal ideals used
in the aforementioned cryptographic applications are highly atypical, because their shortest generators are
also nearly shortest vectors. The second fact implies that the 2O˜(
√
n)-approximate Shortest Vector Problem
(SVP) on arbitrary principal ideals reduces to the Principal Ideal Problem.
Implications and discussion. Combining our main contributions with known algorithms for PIP [BF14,
Bia14, CGS14, BS15] (which are the computational bottleneck) yields the following two main implications:
• First, there is a quantum polynomial-time, or classical 2n2/3+-time, algorithm for SG-PIP, implying a
key-recovery attack for the cryptographic constructions of [SV10, GGH13, LSS14, CGS14].
• Second, there is a quantum polynomial-time algorithm for 2O˜(
√
n)-approximate SVP on principal
ideals in any prime-power cyclotomic. (Note that we do not obtain any improvement over classical
SVP algorithms, because 2n
2/3
time is sufficient to solve 2O˜(n
1/3)-approximate SVP on arbitrary
lattices [Sch87].)
In light of these, an important open problem is to obtain faster classical PIP algorithms, perhaps also using
the guarantee that a short generator exists.
A natural question is what effect, if any, these attacks have on other ring-based problems, such as
NTRU [HPS98] and ring-LWE [LPR10], which are the heart of many cryptosystems. Specifically, the
2The explanation given in [CGS14] is that the secret generator corresponds to a vector that is short relative to the determinant
of the log-unit lattice. As far as we can tell, this by itself is not enough to substantiate the claim, as it ignores the geometry of the
log-unit lattice and the quality of the output produced by the LLL algorithm.
3Strictly speaking, the polynomial running time of this algorithm depends on a number-theoretic conjecture regarding the class
numbers h+(m); see Section 2.4 for details.
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theoretical foundation of the ring-LWE problem is the conjectured quantum hardness of approximate-SVP
on arbitrary ideals, usually in a cyclotomic ring and for (near-)polynomial approximation factors. As far
as we can tell, the above-described algorithms do not appear to affect this foundation: the first crucially
relies on the existence of an “unusually short” generator, the second is inherently limited to relatively large
SVP approximation factors, and both apply only to principal ideals. An important question is whether these
barriers can be overcome, and if so, whether this leads to attacks on ring-LWE or NTRU themselves.
In a complementary direction, another interesting question is whether the above attacks can be extended
to other families of non-cyclotomic rings, such as those suggested in [Ber14b]. For this it may suffice to find
(by analysis, computation, or both) a suitably good basis of the log-unit lattice, or of a sublattice of not too
large index.
Acknowledgments. We thank Dan Bernstein, Jean-Franc¸ois Biasse, Sean Hallgren, Sorina Ionica, Dimitar
Jetchev, Paul Kirchner, Shinya Okumara, Rene´ Schoof, Alice Silverberg, and Harold M. Stark for com-
ments and many insightful conversations on topics related to this work. We also especially thank Dan
Shepherd [She14] for explaining many additional details about the claims made in [CGS14], and for sharing
other helpful observations.
2 Preliminaries
We denote column vectors by lower-case bold letters (e.g., x) and matrices by upper-case bold letters (e.g.,X).
We often adopt the nonstandard, but very useful, convention of indexing rows and columns by particular
finite sets (not necessarily {1, . . . , n}), and identify a matrix with its indexed set of column vectors. The
canonical scalar product over Rn and over Cn is denoted 〈·, ·〉, and ‖·‖ denotes the Euclidean norm. For a
complex number z ∈ C, z denotes its complex conjugate, and |z| = √z · z denotes its magnitude.
2.1 Lattices and BDD
A lattice L is a discrete additive subgroup of Rn for some positive integer n. The minimum distance of L is
λ1(L) := minv∈L\{0}‖v‖, the length of a shortest nonzero lattice vector. Every lattice is generated as the
integer linear combinations of some (non-unique) R-linearly independent basis vectors B = {b1, . . . ,bk},
as L = L(B) := {∑kj=1 Z · bj}, where k ≤ n is called the rank of the lattice.
Letting span denote the R-linear span of a set, the dual basis B∨ = {b∨1 , . . . ,b∨k } ⊂ span(B) and dual
lattice L = L(B∨) are defined to satisfy 〈b∨j ,bj′〉 = δj,j′ for all j, j′, where the Kronecker delta δj,j′ = 1 if
j = j′, and is 0 otherwise. In other words, Bt ·B∨ = (B∨)t ·B is the identity matrix.
In this work we deal with a computational problem on lattices called bounded-distance decoding (BDD):
given a lattice basis B ⊂ Rn of L = L(B) and a target point t ∈ span(L) with the guarantee that
minv∈L‖v − t‖ ≤ r for some known r < λ1(L)/2, find the unique v ∈ L closest to t (i.e., such that
‖v − t‖ ≤ r). In fact, in our context B and r will be fixed in advance, and t is the only input that may vary.
A standard approach to solve BDD (and related problems) is the “round-off” algorithm of [Bab85], which
simply returns B · b(B∨)t · te, where the rounding function bce := bc+ 12c ∈ Z is applied to each coordinate
independently. (Notice that (B∨)t · t is the coefficient vector of t with respect to basis B.) We recall the
following standard fact about this algorithm, and include a brief proof for completeness.
Claim 2.1. Let L ⊂ Rn be a lattice with basis B, and let t = v + e ∈ Rn for some v ∈ L, e ∈ Rn. If
〈b∨j , e〉 ∈ [−12 , 12) for all j, then on input t and basis B, the round-off algorithm outputs v.
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Proof. Because v = Bz for some integer vector z, we have (B∨)t · t = z+ (B∨)t · e, so by hypothesis on
the 〈bj , e〉, we have b(B∨)t · te = z. The claim follows.
2.2 Circulant Matrices
We recall some standard facts about circulant matrices for a finite abelian group (G, ·), and their relationship
with the characters of the group. See, e.g., see [Lan02] for further details and proofs.
Definition 2.2 (Circulant matrix). For a vector a = (ag)g∈G indexed by G, the G-circulant matrix associ-
ated with a is the G-by-G matrix whose (i, j)th entry is aij−1 .
Note that the transpose of any G-circulant matrix (associated with (ag)g∈G) is also a G-circulant matrix
(associated with (ag−1)g∈G).
Definition 2.3 (Character group). A character is a group morphism χ : G → {u ∈ C : |u| = 1}, i.e.,
χ(g · h) = χ(g) · χ(h) for all g, h ∈ G. The character group (Gˆ, ·) is the set of characters of G, with the
group operation being the usual multiplication of functions, i.e., (χ · ψ)(g) = χ(g) · ψ(g).
A basic fact is that |Gˆ| = |G|. Notice that for a character χ ∈ Gˆ, we have χ(g) = χ(g)−1 = χ(g−1).
We identify χ with the vector (χ(g))g∈G. Then all characters χ have Euclidean norm ‖χ‖ =
√|G|, because
〈χ, χ〉 =
∑
g∈G
χ(g) · χ(g) =
∑
g∈G
1 = |G|.
Moreover, distinct characters χ, ψ are orthogonal:
〈χ, ψ〉 =
∑
g∈G
χ(g) · ψ(g) =
∑
g∈G
(χ · ψ−1)(g) = 0.
Therefore, the complex G-by-Gˆ matrix
PG := |G|−1/2 ·
(
χ(g)
)
g∈G,χ∈Gˆ
is unitary, i.e., P−1G = P
∗
G, the conjugate transpose of PG.
Lemma 2.4. A complex matrix A is G-circulant if and only if the Gˆ-by-Gˆ matrix P−1G ·A ·PG is diagonal;
equivalently, the columns of PG are the eigenvectors of A. If A is the G-circulant matrix associated
with a = (ag)g∈G, its eigenvalue corresponding to χ ∈ Gˆ is λχ = 〈a, χ〉 =
∑
g∈G ag · χ(g).
It follows that every row and column of A has squared Euclidean norm
‖a‖2 = ‖P∗G · a‖2 = |G|−1 ·
∑
χ∈Gˆ
|λχ|2.
It also follows that A−1 (when defined) is G-circulant, with eigenvalue λ−1χ for eigenvector χ.
Proof. Suppose that A is G-circulant, and let χ ∈ Gˆ be a character of G. Then
(A · χ)g =
∑
h∈G
agh−1 · χ(h) =
(∑
k∈G
ak · χ(k)
)
· χ(g),
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where in the final equality we have substituted k = gh−1 and used χ(h) = χ(k) · χ(g). So A · χ = λχ · χ.
For the other direction, it suffices by linearity to show that Aχ = PG · Dχ · P−1G is G-circulant for
every χ ∈ Gˆ, where Dχ is the diagonal Gˆ-by-Gˆ matrix with 1 in its (χ, χ)th entry and zeros elsewhere.
Indeed, by definition of PG and because P−1G = P
∗
G, the (i, j)th entry of Aχ is simply |G|−1 · χ(i) · χ(j) =
|G|−1 · χ(ij−1), which depends only on ij−1 as required.
2.3 Dirichlet Characters and L-Series
A Dirichlet character χ is a character of Z∗k for some positive integer k. Note that if k|` then χ induces a
character of Z∗` via the natural morphism Z∗` → Z∗k, so we can equivalently view χ as being defined modulo
either k or `. The conductor fχ of χ is the smallest positive f such that χ is induced by a Dirichlet character
modulo f . The character is said to be even if χ(−1) = 1; note that the even Dirichlet characters correspond
with the characters of Z∗k/{±1}. The character is said to be quadratic if all its values are real (i.e., ±1), and
it is not the constant 1 character (which is known as the principal character). Following the convention used
in [Was97], we often implicitly extend χ to a completely multiplicative function from Z to C, by considering
it as modulo its conductor k (i.e., as a primitive character) and letting χ(a) = 0 if gcd(a, k) > 1.
Definition 2.5 (Dirichlet L-Series). For a Dirichlet character χ, the Dirichlet L-function L(·, χ) is defined
as the formal series
L(s, χ) =
∑
k≥1
χ(k)
ks
.
For any Dirichlet character χ, the series L(s, χ) is absolutely convergent for all s ∈ C with <(s) > 1. It is
also known that L(1, χ) converges and is nonzero for any non-principal Dirichlet character (i.e., χ 6= 1). We
have the following asymptotic bounds on its value; we will only use the lower bounds.
Theorem 2.6. There exists a C > 0 such that, for any non-quadratic character χ of conductor f > 1,
1
`(f)
≤ |L(1, χ)| ≤ `(f) where `(f) = C ln f. (1)
Moreover, for any quadratic character χ,
|L(1, χ)| ≥ 1
C
√
f
. (2)
Equation (1) can be traced back to Landau [Lan27], and improving the constant C is an active field
of research [Lou15]. Equation (2) is also classical and follows from Dirichlet’s class number formula
(see, e.g., [MV06, Section 4.4]). We note that under the Generalized Riemann Hypothesis, the bound in
Eq. (1) can be improved to `(f) = C ln ln f , and holds for both quadratic and non-quadratic characters (see,
e.g., [LLS15]).
2.4 Cyclotomic Number Fields and the Log-Unit Lattice
Cyclotomic number fields. Let L be a field. An element ζ ∈ L is a root of unity if ζm = 1 for some
positive integer m. The order of a root of unity ζ ∈ L is the order of the finite multiplicative subgroup of L∗
generated by ζ. A primitive mth root of unity in L is a root of unity ζ ∈ L of order m. Note that if ζ ∈ L is
a primitive mth root of unity, then the polynomial Xm − 1 ∈ L[X] factors as ∏m−1i=0 (X − ζi) over L[X].
Also note that the complete set of primitive mth roots in L consists of the powers ζj for j ∈ Z∗m.
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An algebraic number field K is an extension field of the rationals Q such that its dimension [K : Q] as a
Q-vector space (i.e., its degree) is finite. If Ω ⊃ K is an extension field such that Ω is algebraically closed
over Q, then there are exactly [K : Q] field embeddings of K into Ω.4 An algebraic number field is Galois if
the order of its automorphism group equals its degree.5 A number field K is cyclotomic if K = Q(ζ) for
some root of unity ζ ∈ K. Its degree is ϕ(m), where ϕ(·) is the Euler totient function and m is the order of ζ ,
and its ring of integers R is monogenic, i.e., R = Z[ζ]. We let U denote the cyclic (multiplicative) subgroup
of mth roots of unity, which is generated by ζ.
A cyclotomic number field is Galois. If K = Q(ζ) is a cyclotomic number field with ζ ∈ K an mth
primitive root of unity then each automorphism is characterized by the assignment ζ 7→ ζj for some j ∈ Z∗m.
As a consequence, if L is an extension field of a cyclotomic field K, then K is situated uniquely in L. For
concreteness, we situate cyclotomic number fields in the complex numbers C. Let m be a positive integer
and define ω = ωm = exp(2piı/m) ∈ C. Then ω is a primitive mth root of unity and K = Q(ω) is the
mth cyclotomic number field. The embeddings of K into the complex numbers (i.e., the automorphisms
of K) are denoted σj for j ∈ Z∗m, where σj sends ω to ωj . The concatenation σ(a) = (σj(a))j∈Z∗m of
these embeddings is known as the canonical embedding, and is used to endow K with a geometry, e.g.,
‖a‖ := ‖σ(a)‖ for any a ∈ K.
Logarithmic embedding. The embeddings σi of K, being complex, come in conjugate pairs, i.e., σj(x) =
σ−j(x). We will mainly be concerned with their magnitudes, so we identify the pairs by indexing over the
multiplicative quotient group G := Z∗m/{±1}. We then have the logarithmic embedding, defined as
Log : K → Rϕ(m)/2
a 7→ (log|σi(a)|)i∈G .
The logarithmic embedding defines a group morphism, mapping the multiplicative group K∗ to an additive
subgroup ofRϕ(m)/2. The kernel of Log restricted toR∗ is {±1}·U . The Dirichlet Unit Theorem (see [Sam70,
Chapter 4.4, Theorem 1]) implies that Λ = Log(R∗), the image of the multiplicative unit group of R under
the logarithmic embedding, is a full-rank lattice in the linear subspace of Rϕ(m)/2 orthogonal to the all-1s
vector 1. We refer to Λ as the log-unit lattice.
Cyclotomic units. Let A be the multiplicative subgroup of K∗ generated by ±ζ and
zj := ζ
j − 1, j ∈ Zm \ {0}.
Notice that zj = −ζj · z−j , so zj and z−j are equivalent modulo ±U ; in particular, Log(zj) = Log(z−j).
The group of cyclotomic units, denoted C, is defined by
C = A ∩R∗ .
The zj given above are not necessarily units in R, and thus do not generate C. However, a closely related
generating set, which we call the canonical generators, is given by the following lemma. Recall that
G = Z∗m/{±1}, and identify it with some canonical set of representatives in Z∗m.
4These embeddings are merely ring morphisms ψ : K → Ω. Each such ψ is automatically injective because K is a field. Also
note that any such ψ fixes Q pointwise.
5An automorphism of a field L is a ring isomorphism ψ : L → L. The automorphisms of L form a group with functional
composition as the group operation.
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Lemma 2.7 (Lemma 8.1 of [Was97]). Let m be a prime power, and define bj := zj/z1 = (ζj − 1)/(ζ− 1).
The group C of cyclotomic units is generated by ±ζ and bj for j ∈ G \ {1}.
Notice that LogC is a sublattice of Λ. As shown below, the index of Λ over LogC is finite. In fact,
it is h+(m), the class number of the real subfield K+ = Q(ζ + ζ¯), defined as the index of the subgroup
of principal fractional ideals in the multiplicative group of all fractional ideals (in K+). The proof of this
theorem is left as Exercise 8.5 in [Was97]. For completeness, we sketch the solution in Appendix A.
Theorem 2.8. For a prime power m > 2, the index of the log-unit lattice Λ over LogC is
[Λ : LogC] = h+(m).
Some facts and conjectures concerning h+. For our purposes, we need h+(m) not to be very big. For
all power-of-two m up to m = 256, and also for m = 512 under GRH, it is known that h+(m) = 1
(see [Mil14]). Whether h+(m) = 1 for all power-of-two m is known as Weber’s class number problem, and
is presented in the literature as a reasonable conjecture.
In the case of odd primes, it also appears that h+ is quite small. Computations of Schoof [Sch03]
and Miller [Mil15] show that h+(p) ≤ 11 for all primes p ≤ 241. For powers of odd primes it has been
conjectured (with support of the Cohen-Lenstra heuristic) that, for all but finitely many pairs (p, `) where p
is a prime, h+(p`+1) = h+(p`) [BPR04]. A direct consequence is that h+(p`) is bounded for a fixed p and
increasing `.
3 Geometry of the Canonical Generators
Throughout this section, let the cyclotomic index m be a prime power. Our goal here is to show that the
canonical generators of the cyclotomic units, under the logarithmic embedding, are geometrically well-suited
for bounded-distance decoding.
Recalling that G = Z∗m/{±1} is identified with some set of canonical representatives in Z∗m and that
Log(bj) = Log(b−j), define
bj = Log(bj), j ∈ G \ {1},
to be the log-embeddings of the canonical generators bj = (ζj − 1)/(ζ − 1) defined in Lemma 2.7. By
Lemma 2.7, these bj form a basis of the sublattice LogC, which by Theorem 2.8 has index h+(m) in Λ.
In order to apply the round-off algorithm and Claim 2.1 with this basis, we bound the norms ‖b∨j ‖ of the
dual basis vectors. The remainder of this section is dedicated to proving the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. Let m = pk for a prime p, and let {b∨j }j∈G\{1} denote the basis dual to {bj}j∈G\{1}. Then
all ‖b∨j ‖ are equal, and∥∥b∨j ∥∥2 ≤ 2k|G|−1 · (`(m)2 +O(1)) = O(m−1 · log3m) .
To prove the theorem we start by relating the basis vectors bj to a certain G-circulant matrix. Recalling
that zj = ζj − 1 is the numerator of bj , define
zj := Log(zj) = bj + z1 . (3)
Collect these vectors into a square G-by-G matrix Z whose jth column is zj−1 , and notice that its (i, j)th
entry log|ωi·j−1 − 1| is determined by ij−1 ∈ G alone, so Z is the G-circulant matrix associated with z1.
For each eigenvector χ ∈ Gˆ of Z, let λχ := 〈z1, χ〉 denote the corresponding eigenvalue.
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Lemma 3.2. For all j ∈ G \ {1} we have∥∥b∨j ∥∥2 = |G|−1 · ∑
χ∈Ĝ\{1}
|λχ|−2. (4)
Proof. Let z∨j denote the vectors dual to the zj , i.e., the columns of Z
−t. (As shown below in the proof of
Theorem 3.1, Z−1 is indeed well defined because all eigenvalues λχ of Z are nonzero.)
We first claim that b∨j is simply the projection of z
∨
j orthogonal to 1, i.e., b
∨
j = z
∨
j − |G|−1 · 〈z∨j ,1〉 · 1.
Indeed, these vectors are all in span(bj′)j′ , the space orthogonal to 1, and moreover, for all j, j′ ∈ G \ {1}
they satisfy
〈z∨j − |G|−1 · 〈z∨j ,1〉 · 1,bj′〉 = 〈z∨j ,bj′〉 = 〈z∨j , zj′ − z1〉 = δj,j′ − 0.
Now, ∥∥b∨j ∥∥2 = ∥∥z∨j ∥∥2 − |G|−1 · 〈z∨j ,1〉2.
Recall by Lemma 2.4 that Z−t is the G-circulant matrix associated with z∨1 , which has eigenvalue λ−1χ =
〈z∨1 , χ〉 for eigenvector χ ∈ Gˆ. By the remarks following Lemma 2.4, ‖z∨j ‖2 = |G|−1 ·
∑
χ∈Gˆ|λχ|−2. The
lemma follows by noting that 〈z∨j ,1〉 = 〈z∨1 ,1〉 = λ−11 .
We now provide an upper bound on the right-hand side of Equation (4). Our proof is similar to the proof
that the cyclotomic units have finite index in the full group of units [Was97, Theorem 8.2].
Theorem 3.3 ([Was97, Lemma 4.8 and Theorem 4.9]). Let χ be an even Dirichlet character of conductor
f > 1, and let ωf = exp(2piı/f) ∈ C. Then∣∣∣∣∑
a∈Z∗f
χ(a) · log|1− ωaf |
∣∣∣∣ = √f · |L(1, χ)|.
For completeness, we briefly explain how the finite sum on the left hand side gives rise to an L-series,
and refer to [Was97] for the details. Using the Taylor expansion
log |1− x| = −
∑
k≥1
xk/k ,
one gets a sum over finitely many a and infinitely many k of terms χ(a) · ωakf /k. For a fixed k, the sum
over a can easily be rewritten as τ(χ) ·χ(k)/k, where τ(χ) is a Gauss sum (see [Was97, Lemma 4.7]), which
makes the Dirichlet L-function apparent.
Corollary 3.4. Suppose f > 1 divides a prime power m. For any even Dirichlet character χ of conductor f ,∣∣∣∣ ∑
a∈Z∗m
χ(a) · log|1− ωam|
∣∣∣∣ = √f · |L(1, χ)|.
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Proof. Let φ : Z∗m → Z∗f be the map given by reduction modulo f . We have∑
a∈Z∗m
χ(a) · log|1− ωam| =
∑
a∈Z∗f
χ(a)
∑
b∈Z∗m
φ(b)=a
log|1− ωbm|
=
∑
a∈Z∗f
χ(a) · log
∣∣∣∣ ∏
b∈Z∗m
φ(b)=a
(1− ωbm)
∣∣∣∣
=
∑
a∈Z∗f
χ(a) · log∣∣1− ωaf ∣∣,
where in the last equality we have used the identity
∏
i∈Zn(1−ωinY ) = 1−Y n and ωnm = ωf with n = m/f .
The claim follows by applying Theorem 3.3.
We are now ready to complete the proof of the main theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Recall that the characters χ ∈ Gˆ correspond to the even characters of Z∗m, because
χ(±1) = 1. Also recall that by Lemma 2.4, the eigenvalues are
λχ = 〈z1, χ〉 =
∑
a∈G
χ(a) · log |1− ωam| =
1
2
∑
a∈Z∗m
χ(±a) · log |1− ωam|,
where the second equality holds because |1− ω−am | = |1− ωam|. Therefore, using Corollary 3.4 we have
|λχ| = 1
2
√
fχ · |L(1, χ)| , (5)
and so by Lemma 3.2,∥∥b∨j ∥∥2 = |G|−1 · ∑
χ∈Ĝ\{1}
|λχ|−2 = 4|G|−1 ·
∑
χ∈Ĝ\{1}
f−1χ · |L(1, χ)|−2 .
We first consider the contribution to the sum coming from quadratic characters. When p is an odd prime, there
is exactly one quadratic character (see [MV06, Section 9.3]), and it is of conductor p, hence by Equation (2)
in Theorem 2.6, the contribution to the sum is O(1) (assuming it is even; otherwise it does not participate in
the sum). In the case p = 2 the contribution is also O(1) since there are at most three quadratic characters
(see again [MV06, Section 9.3]) and their conductor is bounded from above by an absolute constant. Finally,
the contribution coming from non-quadratic characters is at most
`(m)2
∑
χ∈Gˆ\{1}
f−1χ ≤
k
2
· `(m)2 ,
where we used Equation (1) in Theorem 2.6 and Claim 3.5 below.
Claim 3.5. Let m = pk for a prime p. Then, for G = Z∗m/{±1},∑
χ∈Gˆ\{1}
f−1χ ≤
k
2
.
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Proof. Notice that there are at most f Dirichlet characters of conductor f , at most half of which are even
(when f > 1), so ∑
χ∈Gˆ\{1}
f−1χ ≤
k∑
`=1
p`
2
· 1
p`
=
k
2
.
4 Algorithmic Implications
The following is our main result about the decoding algorithm, showing that under mild restrictions on the
distribution of the short generator, one can recover it from any generator that differs from it by a unit in C.
Roughly speaking, the requirement from the distribution is that the ratios between its complex embeddings
are not too large. We note that since the vi below are assumed to be orthogonal to the all-1 vector, the scale
of the distribution (or variance in the case of Gaussians) is irrelevant: this should not come as a surprise,
since, e.g., one can normalize the input generator g′ to have algebraic norm 1.
Theorem 4.1. LetD be a distribution overQ(ζ) with the property that for any tuple of vectors v1, . . . ,vϕ(m)/2−1 ∈
Rϕ(m)/2 of Euclidean norm 1 that are orthogonal to the all-1 vector 1, the probability that |〈Log(g),vi〉| <
c
√
m · (logm)−3/2 holds for all i is at least some α > 0, where g is chosen from D and c is a universal
constant. Then there is an efficient algorithm that given g′ = g · u, where g is chosen from D and u ∈ C is a
cyclotomic unit, outputs an element of the form ±ζjg with probability at least α.
Proof. The algorithm applies the round-off algorithm from Claim 2.1 to Log(g′) = Log(g) + Log(u), using
the vectors bj (defined and analyzed in Section 3) as the basis. By the assumption on D and Theorem 3.1,
with probability at least α the output is Log(u) ∈ Log(C). We next find integer coefficients aj such that
Log(u) =
∑
ajbj , and compute u′ =
∏
b
aj
j . Since Log(u
′) = Log(u) it follows that u′ must be of the form
±ζju for some sign and some j. Therefore, g′/u′ is the desired element.
In the next section we show that the condition on D in the theorem is satisfied by several natural
distributions.
One possible concern with the above algorithm is that it expects as input g ·u for a cyclotomic unit u ∈ C,
whereas the first phase of the attack described in the introduction, i.e., a PIP algorithm, is only guaranteed to
output g · u for an arbitrary unit u ∈ R∗. There are several reasons why this should not be an issue. First,
as mentioned in Section 2, in some cases, e.g., for power-of-2 cyclotomic, it is conjectured that C = R∗.
More generally, the index of C in R∗, which we recall is h+, the class number of the totally real subfield,
is often small. In such a case, if we have a list of coset representatives of C in R∗, we can enumerate over
all of them and use the algorithm above to recover g, increasing the running time only by a factor of h+. In
order to obtain such a list of representatives, we can use an algorithm for computing the unit group, either
classical [BF14] or quantum [EHKS14]. These algorithms are no slower than the known PIP algorithms and
moreover, need only be applied once for a given cyclotomic field (as opposed to once for each public key).
Alternatively, by running the PIP algorithm multiple times on a basis of a principal ideal with a known short
generator chosen using the secret key generation algorithm, we can recover a list of representatives for all the
cosets that show up as output of the PIP algorithm with non-negligible probability; we can then enumerate
over that list.
In the above statement and proof we glossed over issues of precision and assumed for simplicity, as one
often does, that the input g′ is given exactly. To be fully rigorous, one needs to verify that the algorithm
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can deal with inputs that are specified with finite precision, and still runs in time polynomial in its input
size. Typically, by finite precision one means that the input is given in fixed-point representation, providing
additive approximation to the true numbers. Here, however, it is more natural to assume that the input is given
in (the strictly more general) floating-point representation, providing multiplicative approximation to the true
numbers. Not only is this more natural, but also the known PIP algorithms [BF14, Bia14, BS15] generate an
output in this format, or an output that can be easily converted to this format.6 Luckily, dealing with floating-
point inputs is straightforward. First notice that Log(g′) can be written in standard fixed-point representation,
and so can Log(u). The integer coefficients aj can be stored exactly since they are at most exponential in the
input size. Finally, by using a sufficiently good multiplicative approximation of bj (with the multiplicative
error being much less than 1/aj), we can obtain an arbitrarily good multiplicative approximation of u′. As a
result we get a multiplicative approximation of the desired output g′/u′ that can be made essentially as good
as the multiplicative approximation of the input g′.
5 Tail Bounds
In this section we show that the condition on D in Theorem 4.1 is satisfied by two natural distributions: the
continuous Gaussian and a wide enough discrete Gaussian (over any lattice). This section is independent
of the other sections in this paper, and we avoid the use of notation from algebraic number theory. Instead,
we identify elements of K with vectors in Rϕ(m) by taking the real and the imaginary part of their ϕ(m)/2
complex embeddings, i.e., a is mapped to (<(σj(a)),=(σj(a)))j∈G. As a result, all random variables
appearing here are real. The results in this section should be easy to extend to other distributions.
We start with Lemma 5.2, a tail bound on the sum of subexponential random variables. The proof is based
on a standard Bernstein argument, and follows the proof in [Ver12] apart from some minor modifications for
convenience.
Definition 5.1. For α, β > 0, a random variable X is (α, β)-subexponential if
E[cosh(αX)] ≤ β ,
where recall that cosh(x) := (ex + e−x)/2.
Lemma 5.2 (Tail bound). LetX1, . . . , Xn be independent centered (i.e., expectation zero) (α, β)-subexponential
random variables. Then, for any a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Rn and every t ≥ 0,
Pr
[∣∣∣∑ aiXi∣∣∣ ≥ t] ≤ 2 exp(−min( α2t2
8β‖a‖22
,
αt
2‖a‖∞
))
.
Proof. By scaling, we can assume without loss of generality that α = 1. Next, we use the inequality
eδx − δx− 1 ≤ (eδx − δx− 1) + (e−δx + δx− 1) = 2(cosh(δx)− 1) ≤ 2δ2(cosh(x)− 1)
which holds for all−1 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and all x ∈ R, where the second inequality follows from the Taylor expansion.
By applying this inequality to a (1, β)-subexponential centered random variable X , and taking expectations
we see that for all −1 ≤ δ ≤ 1,
E[exp(δX)] ≤ 1 + 2δ2 E[cosh(X)− 1]
≤ 1 + 2δ2(β − 1) ≤ exp(2δ2β) . (6)
6In general number fields (in fact already in quadratic number fields), the use of floating point is necessary, since generators are
typically doubly exponentially large and so would require exponential time to write down in fixed-point notation.
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Using Markov’s inequality, we can bound the upper tail probability for any λ > 0 as
Pr
[∑
aiXi ≥ t
]
= Pr
[
exp
(
λ
∑
aiXi
)
≥ exp(λt)
]
≤ exp(−λt) · E
[
exp
(
λ
∑
aiXi
)]
= exp(−λt) ·
∏
E[exp(λaiXi)]
≤ exp(−λt+ 2βλ2‖a‖22) ,
where in the second inequality we used (6) and assumed that λ‖a‖∞ ≤ 1. Taking λ = min(t/(4β‖a‖22), 1/‖a‖∞)
this bound becomes at most
exp
(
−min
(
t2
8β‖a‖22
,
t
2‖a‖∞
))
.
We complete the proof by applying the same argument with −a.
The next claim follows immediately from Definition 5.1.
Claim 5.3. If Y is a non-negative random variable such that both E[Y ] and E[Y −1] are finite, then log Y is
a (1, β)-subexponential random variable for some β > 0.
The following is an immediate corollary of the tail bound. It shows that the condition in Theorem 4.1
holds with overwhelming probability for a continuous Gaussian distribution of any radius that is spherical in
the embedding basis. Notice that the parameter r plays no role in the conclusion of the statement.
Lemma 5.4. Let X1, . . . , Xn, X ′1, . . . , X ′n be i.i.d. N(0, r) variables for some r > 0, and let Xˆi = (X2i +
X ′2i )
1/2. Then, for any vectors a(1), . . . ,a(`) ∈ Rn of Euclidean norm 1 that are orthogonal to the all-1
vector, and every t ≥ C for some universal constant C,
Pr
[
∃j,
∣∣∣∑
i
a
(j)
i log(Xˆi)
∣∣∣ ≥ t] ≤ 2` exp(−t/2) .
Proof. By union bound, it suffices to prove the lemma for the case ` = 1, and we let a = a(1). Since∑
ai = 0, we can assume without loss of generality that r = 1. Notice that Xˆi has a chi distribution with
2 degrees of freedom (also known as a Rayleigh distribution) whose density function is given by xe−x2/2
for x > 0 and zero otherwise. In particular, it is easy to see that both E[Xˆi] and E[Xˆ−1i ] are finite (both
are
√
pi/2). Therefore, by Claim 5.3, log Xˆi is (1, β) subexponential for some constant β > 0. From this it
follows that Xˆi = log Xˆi−E[log Xˆi] are centered (1, β′) subexponential random variables for some constant
β′ > 0. The result now follows by applying Lemma 5.2 to Xˆ1, . . . , Xˆn, using the bound ‖a‖∞ ≤ 1, and the
observation that
∑
i ai E[log Xˆi] = 0.
In the next lemma we show that small perturbations of the continuous Gaussian distribution still satisfy
the condition in Theorem 4.1.
Lemma 5.5. Let X = (X1, . . . , Xn, X ′1, . . . , X ′n) be i.i.d. N(0, r) variables for some r > 0, and let
Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn, Y
′
1 , . . . , Y
′
n) be a (not necessarily independent) random vector satisfying ‖Y ‖2 ≤ u with
probability 1 for some u ≤ r/(20√n). Let Z = X + Y and define Xˆi, Yˆi, Zˆi as before. Then for any
vectors a(1), . . . ,a(`) ∈ Rn of Euclidean norm 1 that are orthogonal to the all-1 vector, it holds with constant
probability that for all j, ∣∣∣∑
i
a
(j)
i log(Zˆi)
∣∣∣ ≤ 1 + 10 log ` .
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Proof. By Lemma 5.4 we have that with some constant probability close to 1,
∀j,
∣∣∣∑
i
a
(j)
i log(Xˆi)
∣∣∣ < 10 log ` . (7)
Moreover, since Xˆi < r/(10
√
n) implies that both |Xi| and |X ′i| are smaller than r/(10
√
n), we see that by
independence of Xi, X ′i, the probability of the former event is at most c/n for some small constant c. As a
result we have that with constant probability close to 1,
∀i, Xˆi > r/(10
√
n) .
In the following we assume that these two conditions hold (which happens with constant probability close to
1 by union bound), and bound the effect of Y . Now let a be one of the vectors in the statement of the lemma.
Then, ∣∣∣∑
i
ai log(Zˆi)
∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∑
i
ai log(Xˆi)
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∑
i
ai log(Zˆi/Xˆi)
∣∣∣
≤ 10 log `+
∣∣∣∑
i
ai log(Zˆi/Xˆi)
∣∣∣ ,
where we used Eq. (7). Notice that by the triangle inequality (for two-dimensional Euclidean space),
Xˆi − Yˆi ≤ Zˆi ≤ Xˆi + Yˆi .
Since Yˆi ≤ ‖Y ‖2 ≤ u ≤ r/(20
√
n) ≤ Xˆi/2, and using the inequality | log(1 + δ)| ≤ 2|δ| valid for all
δ ∈ [−1/2, 1/2], ∣∣∣∑
i
ai log(Zˆi/Xˆi)
∣∣∣ ≤ (∑
i
(log(Zˆi/Xˆi))
2
)1/2
≤
(∑
i
(2Yˆi/Xˆi)
2
)1/2
≤ 20√n/r ·
(∑
i
Yˆ 2i
)1/2
≤ 20√nu/r ≤ 1 ,
where the first inequality follows from Cauchy-Schwarz.
Finally, we consider the spherical (in the embedding basis) discrete Gaussian distribution over an arbitrary
lattice L ⊆ R2n. Such distributions show up often in cryptographic constructions (see, e.g., [LPR13]), and
often that lattice is the (embedding of the) ring of integers R. For background on the discrete Gaussian
distribution and the smoothing parameter, see, e.g., [MR04]. In order to apply Lemma 5.5 to this distribution,
takeX to be the continuous GaussianDr for some r ≥ 100nηε(L), and Y the discrete GaussianDL−X,s over
the coset L−X of parameter s = ηε(L) for some negligible parameter ε. Using Banaszczyk’s result [Ban93]
we have that with all but exponentially small probability in n, ‖Y ‖2 ≤
√
2nηε(L) ≤ r/(60
√
n). Moreover,
by the lemma below, the distribution of Z = X + Y is within negligible statistical distance of the discrete
Gaussian distribution DL,r′ for r′ = (r2 + ηε(L)2)1/2. We therefore see that the condition in Theorem 4.1
holds for the discrete Gaussian distribution DL,r′ for any lattice L and any r′ > 200nηε(L).
Lemma 5.6 (Special case of [Pei10, Theorem 3.1]). Let L be a lattice and r, s > 0 be such that s ≥ ηε(L)
for some ε ≤ 1/2. Then if we choose x from the continuous Gaussian Dr and then choose y from the discrete
Gaussian DL−x,s then x+ y is within statistical distance 8ε of the discrete Gaussian DL,(r2+s2)1/2 .
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6 Shortest Generators of Principal Ideals and an SVP Algorithm
In a principal ideal I , how long (in the Euclidean norm) can the shortest generator be, relative to its algebraic
norm? In this section we provide lower and upper bounds showing that for a cyclotomic ring R of prime-
power index m, the answer is exp(Θ˜(
√
m)) · S(I), where S(I) = N(I)1/ϕ(m) is the dimension-normalized
algebraic norm of I, and Θ˜ hides polylogarithmic factors. (To be precise, the lower bound is under the mild
conjecture that h+(m) = 2O(m); see the end of Section 2.4.) By contrast, it is well known (see, e.g., [PR07,
Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2]) that the minimum distance (i.e., the length of a shortest nonzero vector) of any ideal
is bounded by Ω(
√
m) · S(I) and O(m) · S(I), by the arithmetic-mean/geometric-mean inequality and
Minkowski’s theorem, respectively. Therefore, any algorithm that always outputs a generator when given a
principal ideal (e.g., the algorithm analyzed in the previous sections) obtains no better than a exp(Ω˜(
√
m))
approximation factor for the Shortest Vector Problem, in the worst case.
We first show in Section 6.1 that upper and lower bounds on shortest generators follow directly from an
analysis of the covering radius of the log-unit lattice Λ (and its sublattice LogC), in the `∞ and `1 norms
(respectively). Sections 6.2 and 6.3 then prove upper and lower bounds on these covering radii. In fact, the
proofs demonstrate more: the lower bound holds for “almost all” principal ideals, and the upper bound is
algorithmic in the following sense: given an arbitrary generator (which can be found using the quantum PIP
algorithm of [BS15, BS16]), we can efficiently find a generator satisfying the bound, which in particular is a
exp(O˜(
√
m))-approximate shortest vector in the ideal.
Throughout this section we let m > 2 be a prime power, and let n := |G| = ϕ(m)/2 = Θ(m). Let H
be the subspace of Rn spanned by Λ = LogR∗ (and by LogC, the log embedding of the cyclotomic units),
which is the subspace orthogonal to 1, the all-1s vector. Define the covering radius of a lattice L with respect
to the `p norm as
µ(p)(L) = max
x∈span(L)
min
v∈L
‖x− v‖p = max
x∈span(L)
min
v∈x+L
‖v‖p .
6.1 Relation to Covering Radius
For any g ∈ R, let I = gR. Also let g = Log(g) and write it as g = s1+ gH where gH ∈ H . Observe that
s = logS(I), because
N(I) = N(g) =
∏
i∈Z∗m
σi(g) =
∏
i∈G
|σi(g)|2 = exp(2〈g,1〉) = exp(s · ϕ(m)).
Lemma 6.1. Let g, I, s, and gH be as above. There exists an efficient algorithm that, given g and any
hH ∈ gH + LogC, outputs a generator h of I such that
‖h‖ ≤
√
ϕ(m) · exp(‖hH‖∞) · S(I).
In particular, there exists a generator of Euclidean norm at most
√
ϕ(m) · exp(µ(∞)(LogC)) · S(I).
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 4.1, for simplicity we ignore issues of precision; see the discussion at the
end of Section 4. The algorithm lets u = hH − gH ∈ LogC, computes the coefficients aj ∈ Z such that
u =
∑
ajbj , and outputs h = g ·
∏
b
aj
j . Because h := Log(h) = Log(g) + u = s1+ hH , we have
‖h‖2 =
∑
i∈Z∗m
|σi(h)|2 ≤ ϕ(m) · exp(‖h‖∞)2 = ϕ(m) · exp(‖hH‖∞)2 · S(I)2.
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Lemma 6.2. There exists a principal ideal I ⊆ R for which every generator has Euclidean norm at least
exp(Ω(µ(1)(Λ)/m)) · S(I).
In fact, the proof shows that a “random principal ideal,” i.e., one whose generators correspond to a
uniformly random coset of the log-unit lattice, satisfies the above bound with overwhelming probability.
(Formalizing this requires a bit more effort; we omit the details.)
Proof. Let x + Λ ⊂ H be a “deep hole” coset of Λ in the `1 norm, i.e., one for which ‖v‖1 ≥ µ(1)(Λ)
for every v ∈ x + Λ ⊂ H . Because the n coordinates of any such v sum to zero, the sum of the
positive coordinates must be exactly ‖v‖1/2, and therefore there must be a coordinate that is at least
µ(1)(Λ)/(2n) = Ω(µ(1)(Λ)/m).
Next, assume for a moment that there exists g ∈ R for which gH = x, where as before we write g =
Log(g) = s1+gH . Then any generator h of the ideal I = gR satisfies Log(h) ∈ Log(g)+Λ = s1+x+Λ,
so by the observation above, it must have the claimed Euclidean norm.
To complete the proof, notice that even if there does not exist a g as above, one can find g so as to make gH
arbitrarily close to x, which suffices for the above analysis. To see this, consider x = M · Exp(x), where M
is a sufficiently large integer and Exp(x) ∈ Log−1(x) denotes an arbitrary preimage in KR := K ⊗Q R of x
under the log embedding (extended to KR). Then rounding x to a nearest g ∈ R yields the claim.
6.2 Covering Radius Upper Bound and an SVP Algorithm
Theorem 6.3. There is an efficient randomized algorithm that given any vector x ∈ H outputs a vector
v ∈ LogC such that ‖x− v‖∞ = O(
√
m logm) with high probability.
Before giving the proof, we mention some implications of the theorem. First, using the fact that LogC is
a sublattice of Λ, we immediately get the following corollary regarding the covering radii of these lattices.
Corollary 6.4. For a prime power m, we have µ(∞)(Λ) ≤ µ(∞)(LogC) ≤ O(√m logm).
We remark that this corollary can also be obtained directly from Lemma 6.7 below and the non-trivial
result of Banaszczyk and Szarek [BS97] (see also [Ban98]). We also note that if the Komlo´s conjecture is
true, then the
√
logm factor in the corollary can be removed.
It follows immediately from the corollary and Lemma 6.1 that any principal ideal I has a generator whose
Euclidean norm is at most exp(O(
√
m logm)) · S(I). This also leads to an efficient quantum algorithm
providing a non-trivial approximation to SVP in principal ideals, as described in the following theorem.
Theorem 6.5. There is an efficient quantum algorithm that approximates SVP on principal ideal lattices in
cyclotomics of prime-power index m to within approximation factor 2O(
√
m logm).
Proof. Given a principal ideal I, first use the efficient quantum algorithm of Biasse and Song [BS15] to
recover a generator g of I, and as above, write Log(g) = s1+ gH for gH ∈ H . Next, apply Theorem 6.3
to gH and let v ∈ LogC be the output. Finally, apply the algorithm from Lemma 6.1 with g and hH :=
gH − v to find a generator h whose Euclidean norm is at most exp(O(
√
m logm)) · S(I), and output h. It
is sufficiently short since, as mentioned at the start of the section, λ1(I) = Ω(
√
m) · S(I) by the arithmetic
mean-geometric mean inequality.
For the proof of Theorem 6.3, we need a simple probabilistic lemma, as well as a bound on the norm
of the bj . For α ∈ [0, 1], define S(α) as the unique probability distribution on support {α, α − 1} with
expectation 0 (i.e., it assigns probability 1− α to α and probability α to α− 1).
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Lemma 6.6. Let A be an n × n matrix all of whose rows have Euclidean norm at most T > 0, and
let α1, . . . , αn ∈ [0, 1] be arbitrary. Let x1, . . . , xn be independent with xi distributed as S(αi), and let
x = (x1, . . . , xn). Then with probability Ω(1/
√
n), both
‖Ax‖∞ ≤ O(T
√
log n) and
∣∣∣∑xi∣∣∣ ≤ O(1) .
Proof. Since S(α) is bounded, it is a subgaussian random variable of constant subgaussian norm. (See [Ver12,
Section 5.2.3] for the definition and properties of subgaussian random variables.) Because the sum of inde-
pendent subgaussian random variables is also subgaussian (see [Ver12, Lemma 5.9]), (Ax)i has subgaussian
norm O(T ) for every i = 1, . . . , n. Therefore, for a large enough universal constant C > 0,
Pr
[|(Ax)i| > CT√log n] = O(1/n2) ,
and by a union bound we get
Pr
[‖Ax‖∞ > CT√log n] = O(1/n) . (8)
Next, by the Berry-Esseen theorem (see, e.g., [O’D14, Section 5.2]), since the xi have expectation 0 and
bounded second and third moments, the probability that |∑xi| = O(1) is Ω(1/√n). Together with Eq. (8)
and the union bound, this completes the proof.
Lemma 6.7. Let m be a prime power. Then for all j ∈ G, ‖zj‖ = O(
√
m), where zj are the vectors defined
in Eq. (3).
Proof. Notice that
‖zj‖2 =
∑
i∈G
log2|ωij − 1| =
∑
i∈G
log2|ωi − 1|
=
∑
i∈G
log2|2 sin(pii/m)| ≤
bm/2c∑
i=1
log2(2 sin(pii/m))
=
bm/2c∑
i=1
f(i/m) , (9)
where f : [0, 1/2]→ R is given by f(x) = log2(2 sin(pix)). Since f(x) ≤ log 2 for 1/6 ≤ x ≤ 1/2 (recall
that sin(pi/6) = 1/2), the contribution to the sum in Eq. (9) coming from i > bm/6c is at most O(m). It
therefore suffices to consider the contribution coming from i ∈ {1, . . . , bm/6c}. Since sin(pix) ≥ 2x for
0 ≤ x ≤ 1/2 (as follows from the concavity of sine on [0, pi/2]), that contribution satisfies
bm/6c∑
i=1
f(i/m) ≤
bm/6c∑
i=1
log2(4i/m) ≤ m
∫ 1/6
0
log2(4x)dx = O(m) ,
the last equality following from ∫ y
0
log2(x)dx = y(log2 y − 2 log y + 2).
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Proof of Theorem 6.3. Given any y ∈ H , find real coefficients (aj)j∈G\{1} such that y =
∑
ajbj . For
j ∈ G \ {1}, let αj = (aj mod 1) ∈ [0, 1) be the fractional part of aj , and let xj be independent random
variables distributed like S(αj). The algorithm outputs u =
∑
(aj − xj)bj . Notice that u ∈ LogC as
desired. To analyze the distance of u from y, for convenience let x1 be an independent random variable
distributed like S(0) (so x1 = 0 always). Recalling that bj = zj − z1, write
y − u =
∑
j∈G
xj(zj − z1) =
∑
j∈G
xjzj −
(∑
j∈G
xj
)
z1 ,
and so by the triangle inequality
‖y − u‖∞ ≤
∥∥∥∥∑
j∈G
xjzj
∥∥∥∥
∞
+
∣∣∣∣∑
j∈G
xj
∣∣∣∣ · ‖z1‖∞
≤
∥∥∥∥∑
j∈G
xjzj
∥∥∥∥
∞
+
∣∣∣∣∑
j∈G
xj
∣∣∣∣ ·O(√m) ,
where we used the trivial bound ‖z1‖∞ ≤ ‖z1‖2 and applied Lemma 6.7.7 We now apply Lemma 6.6 to the
matrix Z whose columns are the zj . Since Z is G-circulant, the Euclidean norms of all its rows and columns
are the same, and by Lemma 6.7 are O(
√
m). We therefore obtain that with probability Ω(1/
√
n),
‖y − u‖∞ ≤ O(
√
m log n) +O(
√
m) = O(
√
m logm) ,
as desired. The success probability can be amplified by repetition.
6.3 Covering Radius Lower Bound
Let h′ := (h+)1/(n−1), which we recall is conjectured to be constant. Combined with Lemma 6.2, the
theorem below shows that there exists a principal ideal I ⊆ R for which every generator has Euclidean norm
at least exp(Ω(
√
m/(h′ logm))) · S(I).
Theorem 6.8. For a prime power m, the log-unit lattice satisfies
µ(1)(Λ) ≥ Ω(m3/2/(h′ logm)) .
Proof. Using Lemma 6.9 below,
(det(LogC))1/(n−1) = Ω(m1/2/ logm) .
Since det(Λ) = det(LogC)/h+,8
(det(Λ))1/(n−1) = Ω(m1/2/(h′ logm)) .
The theorem now follows from the fact that
vol(Bn1 ∩H) ≤
√
n · 2n−1/(n− 1)! = O(1/n)n−1 ,
where Bn1 := {x ∈ Rn : ‖x‖1 ≤ 1}. To prove this inequality, notice that (1) the volume of Bn−11 is
2n−1/(n− 1)!, (2) the projection of Bn1 ∩H on the first n− 1 coordinates is contained in Bn−11 , and (3) this
projection shrinks volumes by
√
n, as can be seen by computing its Jacobian.
7In fact, ‖z1‖∞ = O(logm), but we do not need this.
8We note that 2n−1 det(Λ)/
√
n is known as the regulator, and a bound similar to what we obtain here can be derived from the
Brauer-Siegel theorem [Was97, Page 43]. This leads to a bound that is both somewhat weaker and ineffective.
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Lemma 6.9. The determinant of LogC satisfies
det(LogC)1/(n−1) = Ω(
√
m/ logm).
Proof. Recall from the proof of Lemma 3.2 that b∨j is the projection of z
∨
j orthogonal to 1. The |G|-
dimensional full-rank lattice generated by {z∨j }j∈G has determinant
|det(Z−t)| =
∏
χ∈Ĝ
|λ−1χ | .
Next, notice that the shortest vector in the intersection of this lattice with the span of 1 is Z−t1 = λ−11 1,
whose Euclidean norm is λ−11
√|G|. Therefore, the dual of LogC, which is the projection of this lattice
orthogonally to 1, has determinant
|G|−1/2
∏
χ∈Ĝ\{1}
|λ−1χ | ,
and therefore
det(LogC) = |G|1/2
∏
χ∈Ĝ\{1}
|λχ|
= |G|1/2
∏
χ∈Ĝ\{1}
∣∣∣∣12√fχ · L(1, χ)
∣∣∣∣ , (10)
where we used Eq. (5). Letting m = pk for a prime p, and using Theorem 2.6, we get that
L :=
∏
χ∈Ĝ\{1}
|L(1, χ)| = Ω((logm)−(n−1−q) · p−q/2)
where q denotes the number of even quadratic characters modulo m, which is at most 3 (see [MV06, Section
9.3]). We conclude that
L1/(n−1) = Ω(1/ logm). (11)
Next, consider F =
∏
χ∈Gˆ\{1} fχ. For each 0 < j ≤ k, there are exactly ϕ(pj)− ϕ(pj−1) characters of
conductor fχ = pj . Exactly half are these are even when p is odd and j > 1, and also when p = 2 and j > 2.
When p is odd and j = 1 there are ϕ(p)/2− 1 even characters of conductor p, and when p = 2 there are no
even characters of conductor 2 or 4. Assuming p is odd (the case p = 2 being very similar), this leads to
logp F =
k∑
j=1
j · ϕ(p
j)− ϕ(pj−1)
2
− 1
2
=
k
2
· ϕ(pk)− 1
2
k−1∑
j=0
ϕ(pj)− 1
2
= kn− p− 1
2
k−2∑
j=0
pj − 1 = kn− p
k−1
2
− 1
2
,
and we conclude that
F = m
n
(
1− 1
2k(p−1)− 12kn
)
= Ω(m)n . (12)
Plugging (11) and (12) into (10) completes the proof.
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A Proof of Theorem 2.8
Proof. First, Corollary 4.13 of [Was97] gives that Z[ζ]∗ is generated by Z[ζ + ζ]∗ and ζ, so it follows that
Λ = LogZ[ζ]∗ = LogZ[ζ + ζ]∗,
since the kernel of Log is the group {±1} · U .
Next, recall that the group of cyclotomic units is defined as C = A ∩ R∗. We define the group of real
cyclotomic units as C+ = A ∩ Z[ζ + ζ¯]∗. The analogue of Lemma 2.7 for the real cyclotomic units, also
included in Lemma 8.1 of [Was97], says that the group C+ of real cyclotomic units is generated by −1 and
ζ(1−j)/2 · bj . So as above, we obtain that
LogC = LogC+ .
The theorem then follows from the sequence of equalities
[Λ : LogC] =
[
LogZ
[
ζ + ζ
]∗
: LogC+
]
=
[
Z
[
ζ + ζ
]∗
: C+
]
= h+ ,
where the second equality follows from ker(Log) ∩ C+ = ker(Log) ∩ Z[ζ + ζ]∗ (= {±1}), and the third
equality is Theorem 8.2 of [Was97].
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B Numeric Data
The previous sections established asymptotic bounds related to the log-embeddings of the cyclotomic units.
Figure 1 gives concrete numeric data for several practical (and even impractical) choices of cyclotomic fields.
This data confirms that the method works in practice.
k (m = 2k) 6 7 8 9 ≥ 10
‖b∨j ‖−2 5.04 8.56 14.69 25.71 ≥ 45.85
k (m = 3k) 4 5 ≥ 6
‖b∨j ‖−2 5.72 13.65 ≥ 34.04
k (m = 5k) 3 4 ≥ 5
‖b∨j ‖−2 10.04 36.43 ≥ 143
Figure 1: Lower bounds on the inverse lengths of the dual vectors b∨j defined in Section 3, for various
cyclotomics of prime-power index. Larger values correspond to larger decoding distances for the log-
embedding of the cyclotomic units.
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